Ford Consumer Finance Credit Company v. Gary Salazar, Peggy Salazar, Gabe Salazar, and Chad Salazar : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1990
Ford Consumer Finance Credit Company v. Gary
Salazar, Peggy Salazar, Gabe Salazar, and Chad
Salazar : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Mikel M. Boley; Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee.
Wesley F. Sine; Attorney for Defendants/Appellants.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Ford Consumer Finance Credit Company v. Salazar, No. 900515 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2929
L)T.o'! 
D • ...;,:/• 
¥ •• U 
60 
.A10 
DOCKET h iO.&Z. -*r/r- cA 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
FORD CONSUMER FINANCE, 
a Corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
GARY SALAZAR, PEGGY SALAZAR, 
GABE SALAZAR and CHAD SALAZAR 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Docket No. 900515-CA 
Circuit No. 903007491CV 
Argument Priority 
Classification (16) 
APPELEE'S BRIEF 
* * * * 
APPEAL FROM THE RULING OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH, 
THE HONORABLE MICHAEL K. BURTON PRESIDING, 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
* * * * 
MIKEL M. BOLEY (0375) 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appelle 
3535 South 3200 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
968-3501 or 968-8282 
Wesley F. Sine 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants 
349 South 200 East, #170 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
364-5125 
3 * W 
ki*~< T « > i . 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
FORD CONSUMER FINANCE, 
a Corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
GARY SALAZAR, PEGGY SALAZAR, 
GABE SALAZAR and CHAD SALAZAR 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Docket No. 900515-CA 
Circuit No. 903007491CV 
Argument Priority 
Classification (16) 
APPELEE'S BRIEF 
* * * * 
APPEAL FROM THE RULING OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH, 
THE HONORABLE MICHAEL K. BURTON PRESIDING, 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
* * * * 
MIKEL M. BOLEY (0375) 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appelle 
3535 South 3200 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
968-3501 or 968-8282 
Wesley F. Sine 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants 
349 South 200 East, #170 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
364-5125 
-i-
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
A. Cases iii 
B. Statutes iii 
JURISDICTION iii 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES iii and iv 
STATEMENT OF CASE iv and v 
A. Nature of Case and Course of Proceedings . . . . iv and v 
B. Facts Relevant to the Issues on Appeal . . v, vi and vii 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT viii 
ARGUMENT 1-7 
1. Ford's Action against Salazar was clearly one based 
on unlawful detainer as defined in U.C.A. Secion 
78-36-3 1-3 
2. Salazar waived its claim of tolling by failing to 
bring the matter before the lower court 3-5 
3. The statute clearly required an appeal within ten 
days of the date of judgment was signed 5-7 
CONCLUSION 8 
ADDENDUM 
I. Copies of determinative statutes 
-ii-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
A, Cases 
Page 
Albretson v. Judd, 709 P. 2d 347 (Utah 1985) 5 
Broberq v. Hess, 782 P. 2d 198 (Utah App. 1989) 4 
DHB Const,. Inc. v. Superior Court, Ariz. 607 P.2d 380 6 
Fashion Four v. Fashion Place Assocites, 681 P.2d 830 
(Utah 1984) 3 
Matter of Appeal in Pima Ctv Juvenile Action, 660 P.2d 
1205, (Ariz. 1982) 7 
Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 776 P.2d 653 (Utah App. 1989) . . . 3 
B. Statutes 
U.C.A. Section 78-36-3 (Copied in appendix) 1 
U.C.A. Section 78-36-10 (Copied in appendix) 2 
JURISDICTION 
Appelee does not object to the jurisdiction of the court and 
accepts Appellants jurisdictional paragraph. 
STATEMENT OF. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Throughout this brief Plaintiff/Appellee, Ford Consumer 
Finance, will be henceforth referred to as "Ford." The Defendant/ 
Appellants will jointly be referred to as "Salazar." 
Ford disagrees with Salazar's statement of issues on appeal. 
Ford believes that Salazar's statement of issues on appeal are 
improperly argumentative. Therefore, Ford suggests alternatively 
as follows: 
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I. Was the lower court correct in its ruling and order that 
Ford's action against Salazar was based upon U.C.A. Section 78-36-
11 and, therefore, subject to a ten day period to appeal? 
II. Can Salazar raise on appeal a matter not dealt with 
below; i.e., the tolling of the ten day appeal period while one of 
the Salazars had filed a Chapter 13 petition before the United 
States Bankruptcy Court? 
III. If Salazar had ten days to file an appeal, by what date 
should the appeal have been filed? 
STATEMENT 0£ TH£ CASE 
Ford, being dissatisfied with the statement of the case in 
Salazar's brief, suggests alternatively as follows: 
A. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
In late June of 1990, Ford filed an action against Salazar to 
evict Salazar from a home owned by Ford. Ford previously had 
served Salazar with a notice to quit premises pursuant to U.C.A. 
78-36-6. (A copy of the complaint along with a copy of the notice 
are attached to Salazar's brief.) 
On July 10, 1990, an answer (without counterclaim) was filed 
by attorney Sine. (A copy of the answer is attached to Salazar's 
brief.) At no time before trial did Salazar object by motion to 
the jurisdiction of the court, nor did Salazar attempt to have the 
matter transferred to the district court. 
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After discovery, on September 6, 1990f a trial was held before 
the Honorable Michael K. Burton, circuit court judge. He ruled in 
favor of Ford. Some of the pertinent Findings of Fact (which are 
included in Salazar's brief) were as follows: 
1. Title to the premises was in Ford's name. 
2. Salazar's claim to the premises was verbal only. 
3. Ford satisfied the requirements of unlawful detainer. 
4. Salazar's claims of fraud were not proven. (This 
issue was considered, because of a pre-trial 
stipulation of Fords's attorney). 
5. Reasonable rental value was established. 
6. Ford was entitled to a judgment of restitution of the 
premises. 
B. Facts relevant to the issues of the case 
Salazar's only ownership claim to the premises in question was 
based upon a verbal contract with Howard Sherwood, who owned the 
premises prior to Ford. (This fact is not included in the 
transcript, but was testified to at the September 6, 1990, trial.) 
Ford's ownership was based upon a non-judicial foreclosure 
sale after the default of payments due Ford by Sherwood on a 
written contract, which was secured by a real estate deed of trust. 
Salazar was making the payments for Sherwood to Ford but was 
in default. Neither Sherwood nor Salazar brought the contract with 
Ford current after Ford filed its notice of default. (See paragraph 
9 of the Findings attached to Salazar's brief.) 
After Ford became the record owner, a notice to quit premises 
was appropriately served. (See paragraph 4 of the Findings.) 
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The complaint stated that Salazars were tenants at will, that 
Salazar was properly notified to vacate, that Salazar retained 
possession and asked the court for an order restoring possession of 
the premises to Ford. (See complaint attached to Salazar's brief.) 
A trial was held on September 6, 1990, in which Ford 
prevailed. Judgment was signed September 10, 1990, and notice of 
the entry of judgment was mailed to Salazar's attorney September 
13, 1990. 
Subsequent to September 6, 1990, the parties did verbally 
agree that Salazar would vacate the premises by midnight, Sunday, 
the 23rd of September, 1991, in return for which Ford delayed 
execution of its writ of restitution, (see lines 15 through 22 of 
page 16 of the transcript.) 
Rather than vacate, Mr. Salazar filed a pro se Chapter 13 
petition. (See page ix of Salazar's brief and lines 23-25 of page 
16 and lines 1-16 of page 17 of the transcript.) 
Ford's attorney, who became aware of said Chapter 13 on 
September 24, 1991, prepared appropriate pleadings, met with the 
bankruptcy judge, and was sucessful in obtaining an ex. Parte order 
granting relief from stay on September 25, 1991. (See order 
attached to Salazar's brief and lines 6-12 of page 17 of the 
transcript.) 
Said Chapter 13 was subsequently dismissed according to 
bankruptcy court standing order #19. (See attached copy of 
dismissal in Salazar's brief.) Rule #19 is based upon the non-
appearance of debtor at the intitial section 341 meeting and/or the 
failure to file the initial statement of affairs and schedules. 
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Salazar's answer does not object to the jurisdiction of the 
circuit court. (See Salazar's answer attached to the Salazar 
brief. ) 
Salazar never otherwise formally objected to the jurisdiction 
of the circuit court nor sought a transfer to the district court. 
Salazar's attorney first brought the matter up at trial. Ford's 
counsel stated that the matter was for unlawful detainer only but 
stipulated that the court could consider equitable issues in 
deciding whether or not Salazars were in unlawful detainer. 
The circuit court's judgment was appealed on September 26, 
1991. With the appeal Salazar filed a document entitled 
"superseadas bond." 
On September 27, 1991, Ford filed a motion to strike appeal 
and exception to bond, which said motion was scheduled for October 
1, 1990. 
By order dated October 1, 1990, Salazar's appeal was stricken, 
because the lower court ruled that it was not timely. The 
objection to bond motion was, therefore, not heard. 
The pending matter is an appeal from the October 1, 1990, 
order only. 
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Summary of the Argument 
Point I. Salazar has claimed that the lower court 
proceedings were not based solely upon unlawful detainer. The 
complaint, trial, findings/conclusions and all other proceedings 
clearly indicate otherwise. 
Point II. Salazar at the final hearing at the circuit court, 
which was considering Ford's motion to strike the appeal, failed to 
even argue that the Chapter 13 filed by Salazar after judgment 
tolled the running of the appeal time until Ford obtained relief 
from the automatic stay. Salazar has, therefore, waived that 
claim. 
Point III. Salazar failed to appeal within 10 days. 
Thererefore, the appeal was appropriately dismissed by the lower 
court. 
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Argument 
POINT I, FORD'S ACTION AGAINST SALAZAR WAS CLEARLY ONE BASED 
ON UNLAWFUL DETAINER AS DEFINED IN U.C.A. SECTION 78-36-3, 
Salazar's first claim is that Ford's complaint was not just an 
action based upon unlawful detainer but was a "hybrid or equity 
action." The facts clearly do not support this claim. Please 
refer to the copy of Ford's complaint attached to Salazar's brief. 
Paragraph one of Ford's complaint is merely jurisdictional. 
Paragraph two deals with the possibility that unknown parties 
may have resided in the premises in question. 
Paragraph three through five establish ownership in Ford. 
Without ownership Ford would not be legally entitled to initiate an 
unlawful detainer action. 
Paragraph six sets forth Salazar's tenancy in the premises. 
Salazars were tenants at will. 
Paragraph seven deals with the statutory notice required by 
U.C.A. Section 78-36-3 (1) (b) (ii), which requires no less than 
five days notice to vacate under a tenancy at will. Ford's notice 
gave ten days. U.C.A. Section 78-36-3 is attached hereto as a 
copy. 
Paragraph eight states that Salazars retained possession, even 
though the notice was served. U.C.A. Section 78-36-3 states that a 
tenant is guilty of unlawful detainer if he continues possession as 
a tenant at will after appropriate notice. It is true that the 
complaint uses the words "unlawful detention" rather than "unlawful 
detainer." However, Ford feels and hereby claims that the intent 
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was very clear, that Salazar was holding over after an appropriate 
notice, and that no further time should be spent in arguing over 
"detention" rather than "detainer." 
Paragraph nine sets forth Ford's claim relative to daily 
rental value, which is a necessary element of damages in unlawful 
detainer. 
Paragraph ten through twelve retain Ford's right to additional 
damages in the event a pending sale was lost by Salazar's refusal 
to vacate. No new cause of action was stated. Ford was merely 
trying to maintain its right to consequential damages. 
U.C.A. Section 78-36-10 (a copy of which is attached) states 
that a judgment in favor of a Plaintiff in an unlawful detainer 
action "shall include an order for the restitution of the 
premises." Accordingly, the prayer of Ford's complaint seeks an 
order for restitution, as well as a money judgment. Salazar, in 
its brief, once again pounces upon a word. Salazar argues that 
"restitution" deals with something other than an unlawful detainer 
action. The statute is clear in refuting Salazar's argument. 
Therefore, the complaint is crystal clear in what it seeks; i.e., 
restitution of premises to an owner from a tenant, treble damages, 
plus possible consequential damages. 
Salazar could have brought certain issues before the circuit 
court either by filing a pre-answer motion objecting to the circuit 
court's jurisdiction, by way of a counterclaim, or by way of a pre-
trial motion. None of these options was taken by Salazar. 
Salazar cannot now, on appeal, raise issues waived below. 
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The complaint was based in unlawful detainer. Therefore, the 
ten-day appeal period applies. 
Fashions Four v. Fashion Place Associates, 681 P.2d 830 (Utah 
1984), is the case primarily relied upon in Salazar's brief to 
support his claim that Ford's action was for more than unlawful 
detainer. In that case the tenant/plaintiff's complaint contained 
four causes of action, including forcible entry and for breaching 
the lease. The landlord/defendant filed a counterclaim which also 
contained four causes, including one for declaratory relief. The 
equitable causes took that case out of the ten day to appeal rule. 
Other than a reservation of rights to seek other damages, 
Ford's claim against Salazar was completely based upon unlawful 
detainer. No issue was raised by either party at trial seeking 
other than unlawful detainer damages and/or relief. 
POINT II. SALAZAR WAIVED CLAIMS OF TOLLING BY FAILING TO BRING THE 
MATTER BEFORE THE LOWER COURT. 
Salazar, on appeal, attempts to raise an issue not brought 
below. At the final hearing held October 1, 1990, Salazar's 
attorney did not mention the filing of chapter 13 as tolling the 
ten day appeal period. In the Salazar brief some claim for lack of 
timely notice was made. However, Salazar's failure to bring the 
matter forward on October 1, 1990, or by a subsequent motion to 
reconsider effectively waived this claim. 
Salt Lake County v. Carlston. 776 P.2d 653 (Utah App. 1989), 
is a recent decision supporting Ford's claim that Salazar waived 
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the tolling argument. In that case Defendant was appealing a lower 
court decision based upon an adverse jury verdict. Although she 
failed to object to the method of jury selection at trial, she 
raised for the first time certain constitutional issues in 
conjunction with a motion for new trial, which motion was denied. 
The appellate court held that it could not even consider those 
issues, due to Defendant's failure to present them in a timely 
manner at trial. In quoting other Utah appellate decisions the 
court stated as follows: 
It is axiomatic that, before a party may 
advance an issue on appeal, the record must clearly 
show that it was timely presented to the trial court in 
a manner sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon. 
Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 894 n. 
2 (Utah 1988). Issues not raised in the trial court in 
timely fashion are deemed waived, precluding this court 
from considering their merits on appeal. E.g., 
Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 837 
(Utah 1984) (heresay objection raised for the first 
time in post-judgment motion is too late to be reviewed 
on appeal); Franklin Fin, v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 
P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983) (issue of contract 
amendment untimely where raised in objection to summary 
judgment). Id., at 655. 
Broberg v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198 (Utah App. 1989), was an appeal 
by a Plaintiff in a slip and fall case also claiming error by the 
trial court in the jury selection process. This court in a per 
curiam decision held that it could not consider such an issue, 
since it was not raised below. In ruling that appellant could not 
raise new issues on appeal not properly asserted or reserved below 
the court stated that one reason was as followsi 
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A timely and recorded objection to the trial 
court's failure to comply with a request at trial puts 
the judge on notice of the asserted error and allows 
the opportunity for correction at that time in the 
course of the proceeding. A specific objection to the 
failure to make a requested voir dire inquiry is 
required so that the trial court may correct its error 
before the jury is selected and empaneled. Id., at 201. 
Salazar failed to even mention tolling at the hearing. Nor 
did he attempt to remedy this failure by requesting a new hearing 
or by filing a motion to reconsider, both of which options were 
available. The appellant court cannot consider the tolling claim. 
POINT III. THE STATURE CLEARLY REQUIRED AN APPEAL WITHIN TEN DAYS 
OF THE DATE THE JUDGMENT WAS SIGNED. 
Judgment was signed on September 10, 1990. The appeal was not 
filed until September 26, 1990. Salazar has argued that he had 
extra time at both the beginning and at the end of the ten day 
period. The statute supports neither theory. U.C.A. Section 78-
36-11 (1953) states "Either party may, within ten days, appeal from 
the judgment rendered." 
In Albretson v. Judd. 709 P.2d 347 (Utah 1985), the Utah 
supreme court on its own motion dismissed an appeal as being 
untimely. The plaintiff in a legal malpractice action failed to 
file her appeal within one month. The court stated as follows: 
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In order to timely appeal, the plaintiff was 
required to file her notice within one month of the 
entry of the judgment. The running of the time for 
appeal is only terminated by a timely filed motion to 
alter or amend the judgment or for a new trial under 
Rules 50(b), 52(b), or 59, Utah R.Civ.P. See Rule 
73(b), Utah R.Civ.P. The judgment from which the 
plaintiff appeals was entered November 7, 1983. The 
plaintiff's appeal was not filed until June 4, 1984. 
No motion to alter or amend the judgment or findings, 
or for a new trial was filed or served within the 
requisite ten days which would extend the time for 
appeal. IcL at 347. 
The failure to appeal within the statutory time was 
jurisdictional, and the supreme court could not consider it. The 
same is true in the instant case. Two Arizona decisions dealing 
with ten day appeal periods are also helpful. 
DNB Const. , Inc. v. Superior Court, Ariz. 607 P. 2d 380, was a 
1980 case in which a justice of the peace court's decision was 
appealed to a higher trial court. However, the appeal was not 
perfected until after the ten day period as required by the 
statute. The supreme court of Arizona stated that the only issue 
before it was when did the time begin to run for appeal. The court 
held as follows: 
The judgment is entered at the time he signs the 
docket, A.R.S. Section 22-242, and the aggrieved party 
has 10 days in which to perfect his appeal, A.R.S. 
Section 22-262. Id,, at 381. 
The aggrieved party did not have extra time for mailings. He 
had ten days. 
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In Matter of Appeal In Pima Ctv Juvenile Action, 660 P. 2d 
1205, (Ariz. 1982), the supreme court of Arizona in a later 
decision dealing with the termination of parental rights and the 
timeliness of appeal in its dicta stated that the aggrieved party's 
attorney has a duty to insure that the time for appealing does not 
pass. 
[I]t has unequivocally been held that it is the 
duty of counsel to insure that matters subject to 
prescribed time limits are acted upon within those time 
limits. Keifer v. May, 22 Ariz. App. 567, 529 P.2d 721 
(1974). To this end counsel has an obligation to check 
the court records to determine the exact date of the 
entry of a final order so he can preserve his client's 
rights to appeal. Thomas v. Western Savings and Loan 
Ass'n, 6 Ariz.App. 511, 433 P.2d 1003 (1967). Id., at 
1206. 
Salazar admits receiving notice that the judgment was entered 
within a reasonable time. The appeal had to be filed no later than 
September 21, 1990. Since it was not filed until September 26, 
1990, the lower court was correct in dismissing the appeal. 
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Conclusion 
Salazar has failed to prove that the lower court case was 
anything but an action based in unlawful detainer, as ruled by 
Judge Burton. He failed to appeal within ten days. His appeal was 
appropriately denied. 
Ford should be awarded its costs on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this day of December, 1991. 
HIKEL M. BOLEY 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
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Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
P.O. Box 70584 
West Valley City, Utah 84170-0584 
968-8282 or 968-3501 
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ADDENDUM 
CHAPTER 36 
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER 
Section 
78-36-1 'Forcible e^ntry" defined 
78-36-2 "Forcible detainer defined 
78 36-3 Unlawful detainer by tonan+ foi ti rm 
less than life 
78 36-4 Right of tenant of agncul tuial lands 
to hold over 
78-36-5 Remedies available to tenant againsl 
undertenant 
78 36 6 Notice to quit - How served 
78 36 7 Necessary parties defendant 
78 36 8 Allegations permitted in complaint — 
Time for appearance — Service of 
summons 
78-36-8 5 Possession bond of plaintiff — Alter 
native remedies 
78 36-9 Proof required by plaintiff- Defense 
78-36-10 Judgment for restitution damages, 
and rent — Immediate enforcement 
— Treble damages 
78-36-11 Time for appeal 
78-36 12 Exclusion of tenant without judicial 
process prohibited — Abandoned 
premises excepted 
78-36-12 3 Definitions 
78-36-12 6 Abandoned premises — R( taking and 
rerenting by owner — LiabihU of 
tenant — Personal property of ten-
ant left on premises 
78-36-1. "Forcible entry" defined. 
Everv person is guilty of a foicible entry, who ei 
ther 
(1) by breaking open doors, windows or other 
parts of a house, or by fraud, intimidation or 
stealth, or b> any kind of violence or circum 
stances of terror, enters upon or into any real 
propi rty, or, 
\l) after t n t e n n g peuuably upon real pi op 
erty turns out by force, threats or menacing con 
duct the party m actual possession ier>3 
78-36-2 "Forc ib le d e t a i n e r " defined. 
Lvcr\ person is guiltv of a forcible detainer who 
either 
(1) by force, or by menaces and threats of vio 
lencc unlawfully holds ai d ke< ps the possession 
of any real property, whethei the same was ac 
quired peaceably or otherwise, or, 
(2) in the nighttime, or during the absence of 
the occupants of (my real property, unlawfully 
enters thereon, and, after demand made for the 
surrender thereof, refuses for the period of thiee 
days to surrender the same to such former occu-
pant The occupant of real property within the 
meaning of this subdivision is one who within 
five days preceding such unlawful entry was in 
the peaceable and Undisturbed possession of such 
lands IBM 
78-36-3. Unlawful d e t a i n e r by tenant for t e rm 
less than life. 
( D A tenant of real property, for a term less than 
life, is guilty of an unlawful detainer 
(a) when he continues in possession, in person 
or by subtenant, of the property or any part of it, 
after the expiration of the specified term or pe 
nod foi which it is let to him which specified 
tei m or period whether established by express or 
implied contract or whether wntten or parol, 
shall be terminated* without notice at the expira 
tion of the specified term or period, 
<bl when having leased real property for an 
indefinite time with monthly oi other periodic 
icnt reserved 
d) he continues in possession of it in per 
M)ii oi by subtenant aftei the end of any 
month or period, in cases where the owner, 
his designated agent, or any successor in es 
tate of the owner, 15 days or more prior to 
the end of that month or period has served 
notice lequinng him to quit the premises at 
the expuation of that month or period, or 
in) in cases of tenancies at will, where he 
remains in possession of the premises after 
the expiration of a notice of not less than five 
days, 
tc) when he continues in possession, in person 
or by subtenant, after default in the payment of 
any rent and after a notice in writing requiring 
in the alternative the pavment of the lent or the 
surrender of the detained premises, has re-
mained uncomplied with for a period of three 
days after s e n ice, which notice may be served at 
any time after the rent becomes due, 
(d) when he assigns or sublets the leased 
premises contrary to the covenants of the lease, 
or commits or permits waste on the premises, or 
when he sets up or carries on any unlawful busi 
ness on or in the premises, or when he suffers, 
permits or maintains on or about the premises 
any nuisance, and remains in possession after 
service upon him of a three days' notice to quit, 
or 
(e) when he continues in possession, in person 
or by subtenant after a neglect or failure to per 
form any condition or covenant of the lease or 
agreement under which the property is held, 
other than those previously mentioned, and after 
notice in writing requiring in the alternative the 
performance of the conditions or covenant or tn<? 
surrender of the propert> served upon him and 
upon anv subtenant in actual occupation of th« 
premises remains uncomplied with for thiet day* 
after service Within three days after the service 
of the notice the tenant, any subtenant in actual 
occupation of the premises any mortgagee oftre 
term or other peison interested in its contm 
uance may perform the condition or covenant and 
thereb) save the lease from forfeiture, except 
that if the covenants and conditions of the lease 
violated by the lessee cannot afterwards be per 
formed, then no notice need be given 
(2) Unlawful detainer by an owner resident of a 
mobile home is determined under Chapter 16, Title 
57, Mobile Home Park Residency Act »•* 
78-36-4 Right of tenant of ag r i cu l tu ra l lands to 
hold over . 
In all cases of tenancy upon agricultural lands 
where the tenant has held over and retained posses 
sion for moie than 60 days after the expiration of his 
term without anv demand of possession or notice to 
quit by the owner, his designated agent or his succes 
sor in estate, he shall be deemed to be held by permis 
sion of the owner, his designated agent, or his succes 
sor in estate, and shall be entitled to hold under the 
terms of the lease for another full year and shall not 
be gutltv of an unlawful detainer during that vear 
and the holding over for the 60 day period ^hall be 
taken and construed as a consent on the p n t of the 
tenant to hold for another > ear i# l 
78-36-5 Remedies ava i lab le to t enan t against 
unde i t e n a n t 
A tenant may take proceedings similar to tho^e 
presmhed in this chapter to obtain possession of the 
premises let to an undc rtenant in cast of his u i la* nil 
detention of the premises underl t t to him i*53 
78-36-6. Notice to qui t — How s e i v t d 
The notices required by the preceding sections may 
be served 
(1) by delivering a copy to the tenant person 
ally, 
(2> by sending a copy through registered or 
certified mail addn Sbed to the tenant at his place 
of residence, 
(3) if he is absent from his place of residence or 
from his usual place of business, by leaving a 
copy with a person of suitable age and discretion 
at either place and mailing a copy to the tenant 
at the address of his place of residence or place of 
business, or 
(4) if a person of suitable age or discretion can 
not be found at the place of residence, then by 
affixing a copy in a conspicuous place on the 
leased property Service upon a subtenant may 
be made in the same manner i*87 
78-36-7. Necessa ry pa r t i e s defendant. 
No person other than the tenant of the premises 
and subtenant if there is one in the actual occupation 
of the premises when the action is commenced, need 
be made a party defendant in the proceeding nor 
shall any proceeding abate, nor the plaintiff be non-
suited, for the nonjoinder of any person who might 
have been made a party defendant, but when it ap 
pears that any of the parties served with process or 
appearing in the proceedings are guilty judgment 
must be rendered against them In case a person has 
become subtenant of the premises in controversy af* 
ter the service of any notice in this chapter provided 
for, the fact t h a t such not ice w a s not se rved on sucb 
subtenant sha l l c o n s t i t u t e no defense to t h e ac t ion . 
All persons w h o e n t e r u n d e r t h e t e n a n t a f te r t h e com-
mencement of t h e ac t ion h e r e u n d e r sha l l be bound by 
the j u d g m e n t t h e s a m e a s if t h e y had been m a d e par-
ties to the ac t ion . ; 1953 
78-36-8. Al legat ions pe rmi t t ed in compla in t — 
Time for a p p e a r a n c e — Service of 
s u m m o n s . 
The plaintiff in his complaint, in addition to setting 
forth the facts on which he seeks to recover, may set 
forth any circumstances of fraud, force, or violence 
which may have accompanied the alleged forcible 
entry, or forcible or unlawful I detainer, and claim 
damages therefor or compensation for the occupation 
of the premises, or both. If the unlawful detainer 
charged is afler default in the payment of rent, the 
complaint shall state the amount of rent due. The 
,ourt shall indorse on the summons the number of 
days within which the defendant is required to ap-
pear and defend the action, which shall not be less 
than three or more than 20 days from the date of 
service. The court may authorize service by publica-
tion or mail for cause shown. Service by publication is 
complete one week ailer publication. Service by mail 
is complete three days after mailing. The summons 
shall be changed in form to conform to the time of 
service as ordered, and shall be served as in other 
cases. »»H7 
78-36-8.5. Possess ion bond of plaintiff — Alter-
na t ive r emedies . 
(1) At any time between the filing of his complaint 
and the entry of final judgment, the plaintiff may 
execute and file a possession band. The bond may be 
in the form*of a corporate bond, a c&sh bond, certified 
funds, or a property bond executed by two persons 
who own real property in the state and who are not 
parties to the action. The court shall approve the 
bond in an amount that is the probable amount of 
costs of suit and damages which may result to the 
defendant if the suit has been improperly instituted. 
The bond shall be payable to the clerk of the court for 
the benefit of the defendant for all costs and damages 
actually adjudged against the plaintiff. The plaintiff 
shall notify the defendant that he has filed a posses-
sion bond. This notice shall be served in the same 
manner as service of summons and shall inform the 
defendant of all of the alternative remedies and pro-
cedures under Subsection (2). 
(2) The following are alternative remedies and pro-
cedures applicable to an action if the plaintifT files a 
possession bond under Subsection (1): 
(a) With respect to an unlawful detainer ac-
tion based solely upon nonpayment of rent or 
utilities, the existing contract shall remain in 
force and the complaint shall be dismissed if the 
defendant, within three days of the service of the 
notice of the possession bond, pays accrued rent, 
utility charges, any late fee, and other costs, in-
cluding attorney's [evs, as provided in the rental 
agreement. 
tb> The defendant may remain in possession if 
he executes and files a counter bond in the form 
of a corporate bond, a cash bond, certified funds, 
or a property bond executed by two persons who 
own real property in the state and who are not 
parties to the action. The form of the bond is at 
the defendant's option. The bond shall be payable 
to the clerk of the court. The defendant shall file 
the bond prior to the expiration of three days 
from the date he is served with notice of lh»* 111 
ing of plaintiffs possession bond. The court shall 
approve the bond in an amount that is the proba-
ble amount of costs of suit and actual damages 
that may result to the plaintiff if the defendant 
has improperly withheld possession. The court 
shall consider prepaid rent to (he owner as a ;MI 
tion of the defendant's total bond 
(c) The defendant, upon demand, shall be 
granted a hearing to be held prior to the expira-
tion of three days from the date the defendant is 
served with notice of the filing of plaintiffs pos-
session bond. 
(3) If the defendant does not elect and comply with 
a remedy under Subsection <2) within the required 
time, the plaintiff, upon ex parte motion, shall bt 
granted an order of restitution The constable of the 
precinct or the sheriff of the county where the [nop 
erty is situated shall return possession of the pi -p 
erty to the plaintiff promptly. 
(4) If the defendant demands a hearing uiidei Sub 
section (2)(c), and if the court rules after the lu-annj.' 
that the plaintifT is entitled to possession of the pi op 
erty. the constable or sheriff shall promptly reiuin 
possession of the property to the plaintiff. If ,u tlu-
hearing the court allows the defendant to remain in 
possession and further issues remain to be ad rah 
cated between the parties, the court shall require th. 
defendant to post a bond as required in Subset ti *rj 
(2Kb). If at the hearing the court rules thai all isue> 
between the parties can be adjudicated without fur 
ther court proceedings, the court shall, upon adjudi 
eating those issues, enter judgment on the merits 
78-36-9. Proof requ i red by plaintiff — Defense. 
On the trial of any proceeding for any forcible entry 
or forcible detainer the plaintifT shall only be re-
quired to show, in addition to the forcible entry oi 
forcible detainer complained of, that he was peace 
ably in the actual possession at the time of the forc-
ible entry, or was entitled to the. possession at the 
time of the forcible detainer. The defendant may 
show in his defense that he or his ancestors, or those 
whose interest in such premises he claims, had been 
in the quiet possession thereof for the space of one 
whole year continuously next before the commence 
ment of the proceedings, and that his interest therein 
is not then ended or determined; and such showing is 
a bar to the proceedings. i9.r>:i 
78-36-10. J u d g m e n t for res t i tu t ion, d a m a g e s , 
and ren t — Immedia te enforcement -
Treb le d a m a g e s . 
(1) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or 
upon default. A judgment entered in favor- of the 
plaintifT shall include an order for the restitution of 
the premises. If the proceeding is for unlawful de 
tainer after neglect or failure to perform an> roiuh 
tion or covenant of the lease or agreement under 
which the property is held, or after default in the 
payment of renl, the judgment shall also dec hoc the 
forfeiture of the lease or agreement 
(21 The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tn. <j 
without a jury or upon the defendant's default, shall 
also assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff 
from any of the following 
(a» forcible entry; 
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer; 
(c> waste of the premises during the defen 
dant's tenancy, if waste is alleged in the com 
plaint and proved at trial; and 
(d) the amount of rent due, if the alleged un-
lawful detainer is after default in the payment of 
rent. 
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the de-
fendant for t\iO. rent, for three times the amount of the 
damages assessed under Subsectii.ns (2)(a) through 
(2)(c), and for reasonable attorney's tees, if they are 
provided for in the lease or agreement. 
(4) If the proceeding it* for unlawful detainer after 
default in the payment of the rent, execution upon 
the judgment shall be issued immediately after the 
entry of the judgment. In all cases, the judgment may 
be issued and enforced immediately HW7 
78-36-11. T ime for appea l . 
Either party may, within ten days, appeal from the 
judgment rendered. i»53 
78-36-12. Exclusion of t e n a n t wi thout judic ia l 
p rocess p roh ib i ted — A b a n d o n e d 
premises excep ted . 
It is unlawful for an owner to willfully exclude a 
tenant from the tenant's premises in any manner ex-
cept by judicial process, provided, an owner or his 
agent shall not be prevented from removing the con-
tents of the leased premises under Subsection 
78-36-12.6(2) and retaking the premises and attempt-
ing to rent them at a fair rental value when the fen-
ant has abandoned the premises. I»HI 
78-36-12.3. Definit ions. 
(1) "Willful exclusion'- means preventing the ten-
ant from entering into ihe premises with intent to 
deprive the tenant of such entry. 
(2) "Owner" means the actual owner of the prem-
ises and shall also have the same meaning as land-
lord under common law and the statutes of this state. 
(3) "Abandonment" is presumed in either of the fol-
lowing situations: 
la) The tenant has not notified the owner that 
he or she will he absent from the premises, and 
the tenant fails to pay rex\\ within 15 days after 
the due date, and there is no reasonable evidence 
other than the presence of the tenant's personal 
property that the tenant is occupying the prem-
ises; or 
(b) The tenant has not notified the owner that 
he or she will he absent from the premises, and 
the tenant fails to pay rent when due and the 
tenant 's personal property has been removed 
from the dwelling unit and there is no reasonable 
evidence that the tenant is occupying the prem-
ises. 1981 
78-36-12.6. A b a n d o n e d p remises — Re tak ing 
a n d r e r en t i ng by o w n e r — Liabili ty of 
t e n a n t — P e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y of t enan t 
left on p remises . 
(1) In the event of abandonment the owner may 
retake the premises and attempt to rent them at a 
fair rental value and the tenant who abandoned the 
premises shall be liable: 
(a) for the entire rent due for the remainder of 
the term; or 
(b) for rent accrued during the period neces-
sary to re-rent the premises at a fair rental 
value, plus the difference between the fair rental 
value and the rent agreed to in the prior rental 
agreement, plus a reasonable commission for the 
renting of the premises and the costs, if any, nec-
essary to restore the rental unit to its condition 
when rented by the tenant less normal wear and 
tear. This subsection applies, if less than Subsec-
tion (aI nolwiifisiaruiing ui.is. mr «,»..< 
re-rent the premises 
(2) If the tenant has abandoned the prein -es 
has left personal property on the premises tiI• • <•• 
is entitled to remove the property Iron, the d.« el-
store tt for the tenant, and recover actual mo\ mir 
storage costs from the tenant. The owner j-h ill v 
reasonable efforts to not if;, the tenant of the Ic • 
of the personal pioperty; however, if the propeit;, 
been in storage for cn'er 30 days and the ien:i t 
made no reasonable effort to recover it 'he n--
may sell the property and apply the proceeds {•>«. 
any amount the tenant owes Any monev leji . 
from the sale of the property shall be handled us <: 
ified in Section 78-4 4 I ft Nothing contained in 
act shall be in derogation of or alter the ov\ 
rights under Chapter 3. Title 38. 
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execut ion. 
There can be one action for the recovery of any <' 
or the enforcement of any right secured ^oleiy 
mortgage upon real estate which action m o t h 
accordance with the provisions of this chapter '> 
ment shall be given adjudging the amount d-a- * 
costs and disbursements, and the sale of mnrtg««.. 
property, or some part thereof, to satisfy said anu»i 
and accruing costs, and directing the sherd! to , 
aed and sell the same according to the provh ion.-
law relating to sales on execution, and a special c 
cution or order of sale shall he issued for that \ 
pose. 
78-37-2. Deficiency j u d g m e n t — Execut ion. 
If it appears from the return of the officer innL 
the sale that the proceeds are insufficient and a h 
ance still remains due, judgment therefor must tl 
be docketed by the clerk and execution may he iss i 
for such balance as in other cases; but no genr 
execution shall issue until after the sale of the nv : 
gaged property and the application of the amouni 
alized as aforesaid. i 
78-37-3. Necessary pa r t i e s — U n r e c o r d e d rig^ 
b a r r e d . 
No person holding a conveyance from or under t 
mortgagor of the property mortgaged, or havin? 
lien thereon, which conveyance or lien does not 
pear of record in the proper office at the time of v 
commencement of the action, need be made o party 
such action, and the judgment therein rendered, a 
the proceedings therein had, are as conclusi 
against the party holding such unrecorded conve 
